Suchergebnisse

Analyzing Robert E. Cushman's study within the context of the Brownlow Report substantiates the argument that the immediate failure of the committee's recommendations—and their influence in the longer term—is best explained within the conceptual framework of changing political orders in American political development. Seventy years later, the field has the historical perspective to see that the committee's work was buffeted by tensions between competing political orders. Today, far from being just an interesting episode in American public administration, we see that the Brownlow Committee's work on regulation, as much as work on executive organization, heralded and enabled a new era of presidential administration.

The Brownlow Committee and report provide the next two episodes in the Commission series. Part 1 is a discussion of the goals of President Roosevelt in forming the Committee as well as their general recommendations. Part 2 is a discussion of the outcome of the Committee's report, including the many offices within the Executive Office of the President. ; https://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/civil_discourse/1077/thumbnail.jpg

The Brownlow Committee and report provide the next two episodes in the Commission series. Part 1 is a discussion of the goals of President Roosevelt in forming the Committee as well as their general recommendations. Part 2 is a discussion of the outcome of the Committee's report, including the many offices within the Executive Office of the President. ; https://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/civil_discourse/1078/thumbnail.jpg

In 1938, Congress rejected a package of administrative reforms that had been developed by a commiuttee of academics headed by Louis B mwnlow. The defeat was the worst that President Roosevelt would suffer in three terms as President. This article suggests that the Brownlow Committee contributed to the debacle in Congress by ignoring evidence that its recommendations would prove contentious. It is argued that the committee members were caught in a dilemma: On the one hand, they wanted to obtain immediate reformsforapresident to whom they felt a personal loyalty; on the other, they needed to maintain a demonstration of neutrality, which made it difficult to undertake the tasks of political management that were essential to craft a viable reform program. The demonstration of neutrality was a combination of arguments and routines that the academic community had invented to allay public skepticism about its members'trustworthiness as advisers on contentious issues.

In January 1937, President Franklin Roosevelt submitted an ambitious plan for administrative reform of the national government to Congress. Roosevelt's reorganization bill was based on a report produced by the President's Committee on Administrative Management–a panel of three "specialists in public administration" appointed by Roosevelt in March 1936 and led by Louis Brownlow, who was perhaps the best-known expert in the field. The Brownlow recommendations produced intense debate in Congress; and the reorganization proposals were ultimately defeated in March 1938 in what historian William Leuchtenburg has described as "the worst rebuff Roosevelt was ever to suffer" in his twelve years as president. The public aspects of the battle over the Brownlow proposals have already received extensive scholarly attention. Some of the most important skirmishes in this battle, however, were not fought in public, and even after half a century they remain largely obscured from public view. One such skirmish was the contest within the academic community about the recommendations on administrative reform that were to be put before Congress.

Reflecting on James Hart and Edwin Witte's analysis affords the field a rare opportunity to observe the complexities of a separation‐of‐powers system in action. In making their case, they underscored the importance of the president having a substantial supervisory role in the way administrative agencies write rules and propose legislative measures. As a result, they ignored Congress's constitutional responsibility to supervise, regulate, and guide these areas of administrative law. Their highly controversial arguments not only provide the field with a broader understanding of the overall mission of the Brownlow Committee, but also we can see how they influenced the development of the administrative state.

Chairman: Louis Brownlow. ; Issued also as Senate doc. 8, 75th Congress, 1st session, with title: Reorganization of the executive departments. ; Cover title: Administrative management : report of the President's Committee. ; Mode of access: Internet.

"Historical Development of American Public Administration" published on by Oxford University Press.

Presidential administration is more entrenched and expansive than ever. Most significant policymaking comes from agency action rather than legislation. Courts endorse "the presence of Presidential power" in agency decisionmaking. Scholars give up on external checks and balances and take presidential direction as a starting point. Yet presidential administration is also quite fragile. Even as the Court embraces presidential control, it has been limiting the administrative domain over which the President presides. And when Presidents drive agency action in a polarized age, their policies are not only immediately contested but also readily reversed by their successors. States complicate each piece of this story. In critical respects, federalism further strengthens presidential administration. Waivers, grants, nonpreemption of state law, and other intergovernmental techniques enable Presidents to effectuate policy agendas when federal agencies lack sufficient authority. States also furnish durability because their policies may outlast a President's tenure when federal policies do not. At the same time, federalism diversifies administration and broadens its representative base. Defenses of presidential power as "accountable" and "effective" sound increasingly empty, if not dangerously autocratic. Yet it is easier to condemn presidential administration than to locate alternatives that connect the administrative state to electoral politics and representative institutions as well as to expertise and deliberation. Because state legislators and governors may furnish these connections, plural administrative states offer the most promising path forward for the contemporary administrative state.